

Aji Deni



**ELITE POLITIK,
DEMOKRASI,
& KETIMPANGAN**





ELITE POLITIK, DEMOKRASI, & KETIMPANGAN

Tentang Penulis



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PENGANTAR PENULIS

Bagaimana Elite Politik mempertahankan kekuasaan dalam demokrasi yang justru berdampak luas terhadap menguatnya ketimpangan? Buku ini sedikit menguraikan latar belakang dinamika Elite politik dalam mengkonstruksi kepentingannya, melabeli dirinya sebagai the *rulling class* (kelompok yang berkuasa). Topik ini sengaja dibahas untuk menemukan model baru di antara referensi yang masih langka lainnya di Indonesia tentang Elite, Demokrasi dan Ketimpangan Ekonomi Politik. Misalnya berbagai ajang kontestasi demokrasi, penguasa dan petahana memiliki keuntungan dalam pemilihan dan politik marketing melalui ikatan keluarga kecil, politik identitas namun justru berdampak terhadap ketidaksetaraan politik.

Berbagai bentuk Elite politik seperti dinasti politik, apakah akan melahirkan ketidaksetaraan politik dan ekonomi yang semakin meningkat, atau justru menawarkan kompromi melalui seleksi politik jika perubahan kepentingan ekonomi representasional dalam pengambilan keputusan itu berubah. Idealnya, kualitas politik yang diharapkan masyarakat bisa diukur dengan membandingkan semua politisi yang terpilih, apakah benar-benar murni bersumber dari kesadaran dan keputusan pemilih yang rasional. Partai dapat memperoleh keuntungan dengan dipilih dan dipilih kembali, artinya mayoritas penghargaan masih bersifat pribadi, karena kerabat di pemerintahan tetap antusias untuk mempertahankan posisi kekuasaannya.

Selain pemilu, mekanisme politisi terpilih menjabat atau diberi wewenang saat memasuki legislatif masih memiliki jejak ketidaksetaraan politik. Pembuat kebijakan dan pemilih seringkali memiliki latar belakang sosial ekonomi yang sama dan saling mengenal satu sama lain. Dari gambaran singkat ini, muncul pertanyaan menggugah, siapa yang paling diuntungkan dari ketimpangan ekonomi dan politik?


Dalam kajian Marxisme, bahwa ide-ide penguasa kelas menentukan rentang waktu setiap zaman sejarah karena kontrol kelas. Masyarakat borjuis modern tidak melenyapkan antagonisme

kelas, melainkan menciptakan kelas-kelas baru, keadaan pemukiman baru, dan bentuk-bentuk perjuangan baru melawan yang lama. Timbul kritikan terhadap ukuran Elite dan intelektualitas sebagai kelas sosial yang memiliki fungsi otonom, kebebasan dan otonomi organ gerakan, memberikan kohesi dan pemahaman. Para intelektual ini berbeda dengan tradisi stratifikasi sosial agama di Eropa yang mendominasi dogma agama, filsafat dan ilmu pengetahuan pada masa itu. Intelektual Barat justru tumbuh dalam kecakapan wacana kehidupan sehari-hari sebagai pembangun, penyelenggara, dan "pembentuk opini yang meyakinkan dan meneguhkan nilai moralitas, bukan sekadar orator.

Adigdaya kelompok Elite diketahui berdampak pada ketimpangan, merusak legitimasi demokrasi, terbiasa mempengaruhi sistem politik, struktur anggaran, mobilisasi partai, dan partisipasi pemilih. Sedangkan Massa dimaknai kelompok rentan dan dalam ingatannya sedemikian mahalannya hak politik dalam posisi yang kurang beruntung pada akses ekonomi karena disebabkan oleh distribusi kekuasaan politik yang tidak merata dan timpang. Kekhawatiran kedua, heterogenitas sosial dapat dilegitimasi dengan mengorbankan kelompok tertindas sebagai pemenang mayoritas. Ini hanyalah masalah lain yang harus diselesaikan. Semua kelompok sosial harus terwakili dalam proses pengambilan keputusan politik suatu bangsa yang demokratis untuk membangun sistem ekonomi yang merepresentasikan politik berkeadilan. Mengevaluasi demokrasi, yang membedakan antara konsepsi demokrasi dari rakyat (minimalis-Elite is), oleh rakyat (menengah-partisipatif), untuk rakyat (sosial-maksimalis). Bagi Para Elite, idealnya memahami bahwa demokrasi harus berasal dari rakyat, dikelola oleh rakyat, dan bertanggung jawab kepada rakyat (untuk rakyat).

Para ilmuwan sosial seperti Mosca, Pareto, Michels, dan Schumpeter telah mengkritik atas dominasi Elite dalam pemerintahan demokratis kontemporer, serta memberi solusi atas efek buruk kekuatan oligarkis dan plutokrasi. Mosca menggunakan istilah *la classe conducte* (kelas yang memerintah) untuk

menggambarkan aristokrasi plutokratis. Mosca dengan fasisme dan perubahan kejernihan hati, kemudian mendorong penulisan ulang karya besarnya dilatarbelakangi oleh kekhawatiran awalnya tentang plutokrasi dan liberalisme. Apa artinya demokrasi jika pada akhirnya mekanismenya (termasuk pemilu) hanya menentukan "anggota kelas penguasa baru yang sebenarnya tidak merepresentasikan rakyat di parlemen, mendominasi hegemoni kelas, mereproduksi hubungan produksi kapitalis, menjadi penyokong kekuatan Elite penguasa, dan memanipulasi massa untuk merawat kekuasaan politik."




Gambar 1. Word Map Topik Referensi
 Sumber: Diolah dari Tree Map NVivo12+

Pemilu dan proses demokrasi lainnya sebagian besar bersifat simbolis karena dalam kajian Elitisme sebagai bentuk represi baru dan ciptaan yang disengaja untuk mendapatkan dukungan dan legitimasi langsung untuk mendapatkan kekuasaan. Pihak lain yang menentanginya mengakui bahwa pemilu yang demokratis menuntut pemimpin untuk lebih banyak mendengarkan dan tunduk pada kepentingan rakyat. Beberapa hasil kajian dinamika Elite kontemporer telah merekam jejak mutakhir tentang varian baru seperti konsensual Elite yang Bersatu, pakta Elite, dan tekanan Elite, interaksi dan kemakmuran.

Elite ekonomi lebih memperkaya diri sendiri, seperti Elite perbankan mampu mengalokasikan triliunan dolar untuk dana talangan, menggerakkan kelas pekerja menengah dan kaya di tengah pudarnya gaya proletar lama. Elite ekonomi juga bermain politik dalam meraup keuntungan, berbagi kesempatan kepada Elite oposisi untuk mengorganisir lawan dan menantang petahana. Sumber pendapatan, insentif, dan keberhasilan memengaruhi keterlibatan politik Elite dalam pasca-materialis). Jenis jaringan Elite lainnya, seperti hubungan antara Elite komersial dan politik, memengaruhi masalah seperti ketidaksetaraan dan kemiskinan, khususnya perselisihan antara bisnis dan pemerintah.

Buku ini terdiri dari 5 bab dengan beberapa sub bab berisikan dengan kesimpulan dan sumber referensi rujukan. Bab 1. Politik dan Ketimpangan Sosial. Sub Bab terdiri dari Elite Politik dan Kekuasaan; Ketimpangan Politik, Ekonomi dalam Dinamika Demokrasi; Tuntutan Kesetaraan Politik. Bab 2. Demokrasi dan Ketimpangan Ekonomi-Politik, dengan sub bab terdiri dari Kebijakan Sosial dan Tuntutan Kesetaraan Politik; Demokrasi dan Ketimpangan; Ketimpangan Ekonomi-Politik. Bab 3. Plutokrasi dan Dampaknya terhadap Ketimpangan Ekonomi, dengan sub bab terdiri atas Sejarah Awal Putokrasi di Amerika Serikat; Konsep Plutokrasi dalam Aliran Elitisme Demokrasi; Plutokrasi dan Ketimpangan Sosial; Elitisme dan Plutokrasi; Plutokrasi dan Dampaknya terhadap Layanan Publik; Meritokrasi Vs Plutokrasi: Siapa Yang Dominan?. Bab 4. Para Elite Dan Demokrasi, dengan sub topik terdiri dari Pemikir Teori Elite Marxisme; Elite dan

Perjuangan Kelas; Kelas Elite dan Intelektual; Demokrasi dan Reproduksi Kelas Elite ; Bab 5. Elite dan Dinamika Ekonomi-Politik, terdiri dari Sub Topik, Elite dan Dinamika Politik Yang Demokratis; Elitisme dan Personalisasi Kepemimpinan Partai Politik; Neo-Elitisme dan Demokrasi; Elite dan Ketimpangan Pendapatan Ekonomi. Sebagai Penutup, dikaji juga beberapa fenomena tentang Indonesia pada Bab 6 membahas 3 sub topik yaitu: Demokrasi yang Cacat, Korupsi Elite Politik dan Kemiskinan; Sumberdaya Alam, Korupsi dan Buruknya Kualitas Demokrasi; Kebijakan Redistributif dan Ketimpangan.



Gambar 2. Word Cloud Referensi

Sumber: Diolah dari Referensi isi Buku Menggunakan Word Cloud NVivo12+

Sumber referensi diakses melalui berbagai media pencari referensi seperti Libgen, Harzing, PoP, dan Mendeley. Tipe referensi berupa Buku, Chapter Book dan Jurnal yang bereputasi Internasional. Hampir semuanya sumber teks buku ini bersumber dari berbagai hasil-hasil kajian, penelitian dan publikasi berbahasa Inggris.

Penulisan buku ini membutuhkan kemampuan dan ketelitian mendalam, memilih keterkaitan dan koherensi antar sumber-sumber referensi yang tersedia. Buku ini dikategorikan sebagai buku referensi untuk memenuhi perkembangan referensi dan fenomena mutakhir berbagai mata Kuliah seperti Sosiologi Politik, Ekonomi Politik dan Pembangunan, Teori Politik, Demokrasi, dan Pemikiran Politik Barat, dan Kebijakan Publik, Dinamika Politik Negara Berkembang, sebagai Mata Kuliah yang diajarkan penulis di beberapa Program Studi. Selamat membaca, semoga dapat menambah pengetahuan dan khazanah referensi.

Ternate, 16 Pebruari 2024

Penulis

Dr. Aji Deni, S.Pd., M.Si

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BAB 1

POLITIK DAN KETIMPANGAN SOSIAL

A. Elite Politik dan Kekuasaan

Bagaimana Elite politik tetap berkuasa? Kelompok populis menekankan konflik berkelanjutan antara warga negara dan Elite politik. Se jauh mana individu atau keluarga yang sama mengontrol kekuasaan politik dapat digunakan untuk mengukur ketimpangan politik. Beberapa ciri demokrasi memungkinkan Elite bertahan, tetapi kualitas politik sangat bervariasi sepanjang waktu dan geografi. Keuntungan petahana dalam pemilihan dan promosi, yang terkadang dapat dialihkan ke hubungan keluarga, dapat melanggengkan ketidaksetaraan politik dalam demokrasi. Elite politik sebagai aktor sentral, seperti dinasti politik. Ketidaksetaraan politik didefinisikan sebagai sejauh mana individu atau keluarga yang sama memonopoli kekuasaan politik di badan legislatif, Pemerintahan dan Ekonomi.

Ketika ketimpangan politik dan ekonomi meningkat, ada kekhawatiran luas mengenai evolusi seleksi politik dan jika perubahan kepentingan ekonomi perwakilan saat ini merupakan faktor dalam pengambilan keputusan yang demokratis. Rute yang menjanjikan ke depan berusaha menyelidiki konsentrasi kekuatan politik di antara Elite legislatif atau eksekutif yang sama atau terkait. Pemilih pada setiap perodesasi demokrasi elektoral akan tertarik dengan program wakil rakyat jika menggabungkan aspek 'kualitas politik', seperti seberapa efektif para Elite politik menyelesaikan janji politiknya. Tipe orang yang salah dapat ditarik ke karir di

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BAB 2

DEMOKRASI DAN KETIMPANGAN EKONOMI-POLITIK

A. Kebijakan Sosial dan Tuntutan Kesetaraan Politik

Demokrasi dan ketimpangan ekonomi politik sebagai topik kedua. Pada kajian ini penulis menelusuri berbagai hasil kajian di dunia ketiga sebelumnya, membandingkan permasalahan ketimpangan dewasa ini. Ketimpangan itu berupa hasil dari dinamika politik yang kompetitif, saling menguasai dalam sumberdaya ekonomi, serta pengaruh struktur sosial dan politik yang tidak berpihak pada orang miskin. Bagaimana bab ini menemukan inti permasalahannya, mengkaji model dan warna kajian tentang kewarganegaraan demokratis (*democratic-citizenship*) yang dikatkan dengan “welfare-state”. Tuntutan terhadap kebijakan negara tentang masyarakat yang sejahtera seringkali tidak terpenuhi merata di seluruh wilayah dan pelosok desa.

Kewarganegaraan demokratis dibentuk oleh negara kesejahteraan, serta cara-cara di mana negara kesejahteraan dapat mengurangi ketimpangan berdasarkan pendapatan dan mendukung kesetaraan politik. Ini mengkaji cara-cara di mana kebijakan kesejahteraan memberi individu keuntungan finansial, meningkatkan arti penting dan relevansi politik, dan menyampaikan gagasan bahwa kepentingan warga negara dijaga dan dihargai. Kebijakan negara kesejahteraan memengaruhi tindakan dan pendapat politik individu dengan menganalisis rangkaian kebijakan yang lebih besar di seluruh kelompok negara yang luas dan beragam.

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BAB 3

PLUTOKRASI DAN DAMPAKNYA TERHADAP KETIMPANGAN EKONOMI

Plutokrasi dipahami sebagai sistem pemerintahan dimana kekuasaan yang diraih oleh Elite politik atas dasar pengaruh kekayaan yang dimilikinya. Dalam Bahasa Yunani, *ploutos* artinya kekayaan dan *kratos* dimaknai sebagai kekuasaan. Dengan demikian, Plutokrasi menggambarkan keterlibatan kaum hartawan (pebisnis, pengusaha, saudagar kaya raya) dalam politik kekuasaan. Kekhawatiran akan terciptanya plutokrasi secara tidak sengaja berfokus pada peraturan akan menjadi sempit dan terkonsentrasi pada tujuan orang-orang kaya, sehingga menciptakan lebih banyak kesenjangan pendapatan dan berbasis aset. Dalam plutokrasi, akses terhadap kekuasaan politik terbatas dan mengharuskan seseorang untuk memiliki kekayaan atau mendapat dukungan dari orang kaya dengan bersedia melayani kepentingan mereka. Hanya kelompok sosial yang memiliki tingkat kemakmuran ekonomi tertentu saja yang dapat menjalankan otoritas politik, mengendalikan dan membeli suara pemilu atau memegang jabatan publik. Plutokrasi menciptakan hambatan terhadap partisipasi dalam politik dan kehidupan politik yang hanya dapat dipenuhi melalui kepemilikan atau pengeluaran kekayaan dalam jumlah besar.

A. Sejarah Awal Putokrasi di Amerika Serikat

Populisme adalah media pemerintah antara dua ekstrem otoritarianisme dan anarki Marxis, lalu menghasilkan tradisi plutokrasi politik Amerika. Ini telah disalahtafsirkan karena

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4

PARA ELITE DAN DEMOKRASI

Hakikat pemikiran teori elite memiliki akar sejarah yang otentik pada gagasan dan warisan intelektual Niccolò Machiavelli dan Thomas Hobbes, kemudian direproduksi oleh generasi liberal Eropa yang kritis dan skeptis seperti Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter, dan Jose Ortega y Gasset antara 1890-an dan 1940-an. Para pemikir teori politik elite mayoritas sepakat bahwa birokrasi kekuasaan cenderung menguntungkan elit politik, termasuk politisi, kepala lembaga negara, eksekutif bisnis, pemimpin buruh, media, dan lainnya. Pergerakan massa dikendalikan oleh jejaring individu berpengaruh dan kelompok kecil yang mendominasi pengambilan keputusan di peradaban modern. Elite memotivasi populasinya untuk berbagai alasan dan tindakan. (Pakulski, 2017:9).

Elite telah menjadi dogma lama yang dikenal dengan istilah *Elitisme*, sebagai keyakinan pada tidak terelakkannya pemerintahan oleh elit, yang melibatkan fokus pada elit sebagai aktor politik dan sosial utama (Hugley: 2017: 29). Kesadaran atau kebanggaan untuk menjadi milik kelompok yang paling dipilih atau disukai. *Elitisme* juga dimaknai sebagai bentuk rasa hormat atau penghormatan terhadap kepemimpinan, menghargai pencapaian, menghormati warisan, atau menegaskan bahwa beberapa ide atau kontribusi lebih baik dari yang lain.

Elite adalah orang-orang yang kuat dan berpengaruh. Mereka disebut “orang-orang yang menentukan” dan memanipulasi populasi. Elite mempengaruhi masyarakat melalui

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5

ELITE DAN DINAMIKA EKONOMI-POLITIK

A. Elite dan Dinamika Politik yang Demokratis

Dalam menyelidiki dasar-dasar demokrasi liberal, yang bergantung pada kemunculan dan keberlangsungan eksistensi Elite yang disatukan oleh konsensus. Elite jarang kompak, memiliki perbedaan pendapat yang mendalam atas hak-hak politik dan adat istiadat, dan mengaku setia pada keyakinan tertentu. Ini merugikan demokrasi liberal, dsan masa depan demokrasi liberal di abad ke-21 bergantung pada munculnya Elite yang saling bersatu dan kelanjutan dari Elite yang terpecah belah. Pembentukan Elite yang bersatu secara konsensual dalam demokrasi liberal difasilitasi oleh pertemuan keadaan yang unik, seperti kenangan pahit Elite tentang perebutan kekuasaan yang belum terselesaikan, krisis yang mengancam konfrontasi baru yang membawa bencana, sejumlah kecil kelompok Elite yang terdefinisi dengan baik dan disiplin, kehadiran kelompok Elite yang cerdas, dan pemimpin yang berwibawa, dan peristiwa yang tidak disengaja tetapi kebetulan. Akan tetapi, dalam sebagian besar konteks kolonial, munculnya Elite yang bersatu secara konsensual terhalang oleh satu atau lebih factor (Schonfeld, 2008).

Para Elite Cina, Vietnam, dan Elite ideologis lainnya waspada terhadap keputusan dan tindakan yang dapat mempercepat destabilisasi mereka sendiri. Kondisi abad kedua puluh satu dapat mengurangi atau menghilangkan hubungan terbalik antara pembangunan sosial ekonomi yang kuat dan

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BAB 6

INDONESIA : ELITE, DEMOKRASI DAN KETIMPANGAN

Sejak tahun 1994, studi tentang elite dan rezim di Asia Tenggara (Indonesia, Malaysia dan Thailand) dilakukan oleh Case (1994 & 2000) dengan meninjau kembali elite di tengah transisi dan Pemilu. Sifat Elite Indonesia telah mengalami perubahan di tengah budaya politik yang baru (Watson & Bill, 2003). Pasca jatuhnya Soeharto, elite politik Indonesia melahirkan konfigurasi DPR RI tahun 1999 yang berbeda (Morishita, 2003). Dasgupta (2007) menggambarkan dinamika elite Indonesia yang terperosok dalam praktek korupsi ketika proyek pengentasan kemiskinan berbasis masyarakat di gulirkan. Ketidakefektifan kapasitas masyarakat untuk melakukan tindakan kolektif, kontrol elit atas keputusan proyek, dan perolehan manfaat proyek oleh elit telah bersampak buruk. Proyek yang dikendalikan oleh elite, manfaat diberikan kepada masyarakat miskin, meskipun kekuasaan didistribusikan secara merata, namun alokasi sumber daya kepada masyarakat miskin dibatasi. Fritzen (2007) melalui hasil penelitiannya, 250 kecamatan di Indonesia menguak praktek elite capture atas proyek-proyek pembangunan berbasis masyarakat (CDD) yang didanai oleh lembaga-lembaga pembangunan internasional yang rentan disalahgunakan elite lokal. Meskipun proyek CDD dapat membantu menciptakan ruang bagi munculnya pemimpin masyarakat elit dan non-elit yang lebih luas, kendali elit terhadap pengambilan keputusan proyek masih sangat luas.

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BAB

7

PENUTUP

Berbagai hasil kajian Pustaka tentang Elite Politik, Demokrasi dan Ketimpangan dapat disimpulkan beberapa pencapaian terpenting dari buku ini. *Pertama*, Elite politik dan kekuasaan berisi semua kekhawatiran yang luas mengenai evolusi seleksi politik dan jika perubahan kepentingan ekonomi perwakilan merupakan faktor dalam pengambilan keputusan yang demokratis. Ketidaksetaraan politik didefinisikan sebagai sejauh mana individu atau keluarga yang sama memonopoli kekuasaan politik di badan legislatif, Pemerintahan dan Ekonomi. Pemilih pada setiap perodesasi demokrasi elektoral akan tertarik dengan program wakil rakyat juga. Orang kaya lebih mendominasi pengambilan keputusan publik bahkan mengendalikan kepentingan politik yang terorganisir pun bisa terjadi. Pembuat kebijakan dan pemilih pada umumnya berasal dari dari latar belakang sosial ekonomi yang sama dan cenderung mengenal satu sama lain.

Kedua, Demokrasi belum mampu memprkecil ketimpangan ekonomi dalam dinamika kompetisi pasar bebas. Politik internal berpenghasilan rendah, berpendidikan, dan terisolasi secara sosial cenderung tidak berpartis. Jaringan pemerintahan, yang memungkinkan akses aktor sektor swasta, cocok dengan gerakan neo-liberal dalam politik. Belajar dari wabah Covid-19, Nafsu ekonomi Neo-liberalisme semakin kuat, mendorong pasar bebas dengan memaksimalkan kepentingan materialnya, mendominasi kapitalisme pasca-industri dan pandemik. Di Pedesaan Papua Nugini, operasi pertambangan, minyak dan gas padat modal, dan

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Bersama tim juga menerjemahkan buku teks Inggris ke Bahasa Indonesia menjadi *Public Administration Theories: Instrumental and Value Rationalities* (Lisheng Dong, Gramasurya, 2021).

Buku lainnya Biografi singkat “Profil Prof. Dr. Saiful Deni, M.Si: Pengabdian Tanpa Akhir (Gramasurya, 2021). Beberapa karya buku lainnya yang sudah diterbitkan antara lain *Membangun Ternate menuju Kota Peradaban: Refleksi atas Agama, Demokrasi, dan Pembangunan di Era Multikulturalisme* (UMMU Press dan PSPK, 2004), *Konsolidasi Demokrasi: Menuju Keberlanjutan Politik Pasca Runtuhnya Rezim Soeharto* (Kibar Press, PSPK Publishing dan UMMU Press, 2006), *Politik Elite Lokal: Pemilu, Konflik dan Multikulturalisme* (Naufan Pustaka, 2014). Beberapa hasil penelitian dipublikasikan di *International Journal of Scientific & Technology Research* (IJSTR, 2018) dan *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change* (IJICC, 2020). Pernah menjadi anggota Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Provinsi Maluku Utara Tahun 2008- 2014. Saat ini sebagai Pengurus AIPI Cabang Maluku Utara (2020-2023), Wakil Ketua Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah Maluku Utara (2022-2027), dan menjabat sebagai Dekan FISIP Universitas Muhammadiyah Maluku Utara 2022-2026.



REPUBLIK INDONESIA
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SURAT PENCATATAN CIPTAAN

Dalam rangka perlindungan ciptaan di bidang ilmu pengetahuan, seni dan sastra berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2014 tentang Hak Cipta, dengan ini menerangkan:

Nomor dan tanggal permohonan : EC00202426494, 23 Maret 2024

Pencipta
Nama : **Dr. Aji Deni, S.Pd., M.Si**
Alamat : RT 009/RW 003 Kelurahan Tabona Kecamatan Ternate Selatan Kota Ternate Provinsi Maluku Utara, Ternate Selatan (kota), Ternate, Maluku Utara, 97713
Kewarganegaraan : Indonesia

Pemegang Hak Cipta
Nama : **Dr. Aji Deni, S.Pd., M.Si**
Alamat : RT 009/RW 003 Kelurahan Tabona Kecamatan Ternate Selatan Kota Ternate Provinsi Maluku Utara, Ternate Selatan (kota), Ternate, Maluku Utara 97713
Kewarganegaraan : Indonesia
Jenis Ciptaan : **Buku**
Judul Ciptaan : **Elite Politik, Demokrasi, & Ketimpangan**
Tanggal dan tempat diumumkan untuk pertama kali di wilayah Indonesia atau di luar wilayah Indonesia : 13 Maret 2024, di Purbalingga
Jangka waktu perlindungan : Berlaku selama hidup Pencipta dan terus berlangsung selama 70 (tujuh puluh) tahun setelah Pencipta meninggal dunia, terhitung mulai tanggal 1 Januari tahun berikutnya.
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